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Legal Aspects of the Lunar Landingst
Man did not find life on the Moon; instead he brought life to the Moon.
Among the most engrossing remarks made at the time of the first lunar
landing were those comparing Eagle's descent to the American voyage of
Columbus, or counting it an evolutionary act as significant as the emer-
gence of life from the Devonian sea to dry land. In a more hyperbolic vein,
President Nixon called the lunar descent the greatest event since Creation.
Still, since most of us remain here on Earth to tend the small Edens of
our individual lives and work, one may well begin to discuss the legal
problems brought to the foreground by the Apollo 11 and 12 successes.
The legal problems arising from activities on celestial bodies may be
divided into those that have already arisen, and those that may be expected
to arise as a result of expanding activities on those new frontiers.
The most important points of intersection of Apollo activities and the
Space Treaty would appear to be the following:
1. The carrying away of lunar soil and planting of the U.S. flags on lunar
bases in relation to Articles I and II of the Space Treaty.
Space Treaty Article I states that the Moon is free for exploration and
use by all States, while Article II says that it is not subject to national
appropriation by any means.
The conflict between Article I - freedom of use of celestial bodies - and
the Article II non-appropriation mandate has been treated elsewhere.' This
conflict is only potential; it does not become actual until a certain magni-
tude of use has occurred in relation to the resource above and beyond a
minimal use for scientific testing and local needs to maintain a space base.
This critical point has not been reached by the removal of more than 100
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pounds of lunar dust and rocks to the Lunar Receiving Laboratory at
Houston, Texas, and distribution of part of this material to scientific
facilities, on request, all over the world. 2 The effect of this distribution has
also been to fulfill the obligation of Article XI of the Space Treaty requir-
ing Parties to inform the public and the international scientific community
of the nature, conduct, locations and results of space activities. This gener-
osity promotes international scientific cooperation as contemplated by Ar-
ticle I.
The rocks taken from the lunar surface are as old as the solar system; 3
are igneous in nature; are said to consist of a mixture of olivine, pyroxine
and calcium rich feldspar; contain much titanium, used for hardening
steel; 4 are mixed with minute glassy spheres- and provide some evidence
of metallic oxides 5 and a metallic core of nickel and iron, similar to Earth's
core. 6 Minute quantities of gold have been detected, but not enough to
finance the space program. 7 Since all the rocks have been used for scien-
tific purposes and no commercial intentions have yet surfaced, one must
await further developments before attempting to predict to what uses lunar
materials will be put.
The planting of American flags on the Moon, displayed prominently, and
duly saluted by the astronauts, appears to have satisfied an emotional need.
Regrettably but not unexpectedly, a U.N. standard was not permitted to
join the Stars and Stripes, pursuant to a Congressional amendment to a bill
authorizing space program appropriations. 8 Awed by the magnitude of
technological accomplishment, no nation protested these arrange-
ments-evidence that there is no strong commitment among nations to
internationalize celestial bodies.
However, national rituals are not necessarily inconsistent, but may be
compatible, with international ventures. In fact, Astronaut Aldrin managed
to bracket the salute to the flag with an "almost mystical unification of all
people in the world at that moment," a syntactical ambiguity best explained
by the journalistic agility of LIFE'S editors. 9 These rituals have absolutely
2The Soviet Union made no request for specimens collected by Messrs. Armstrong and
Aldrin.
3New York Times, August 25, 1969, at 1, col. 2.4Jastrow: The Moon is a Rosetta Stone, NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, Nov. 9, 1969,
§ 6, at 25; SCIENCE MAGAZINE, Sept. 19, 1969, at 1226-1227.5NY Times, July 29, 1969, at 1, col. 2.
61d., August 3, 1969, § 4, at 3, col. 1.71d., January 6, 1970, at 26, col. 1.
'id., July 18, 1969, at 13, col. 4. Representative Allard K. Lowenstein deplored the
Congressional diktat as short-sighted.
9 LIFE MAGAZINE, August 22, 1969, at 26, col. 2-3.
International Lawyer, Vol. 4, No. 3
Legal Aspects of the Lunar Landings
no practical, territorial - or lunatorial - significance. They were not accom-
panied by any declaration of intent to appropriate, and stand in the same
posture as the deposit of the hammer and sickle on the lunar surface in
1959.
Whether the area surrounding the bottom stage of the lunar modules,
together with flags and scientific instrumentation, constitutes a space sta-
tion is problematical, to say the least. The National Aeronautical and
Space Agency informally named the Apollo 11 landing area "Tranquility
Base," but no official claim has been made to any special rights in the area
concerned. Automatically, under Article VIII of the Space Treaty, own-
ership and jurisdiction of residual artifacts on the Moon remain with the
United States. These objects fall under the heading of "equipment," "space
vehicles" and perhaps "installations" mentioned in Article XII. Accord-
ingly, they are open to inspection by representatives of any other State.
The same Article requires that the visiting State give reasonable advance
notice to the U.S. of any visit, followed by consultations deemed appro-
priate.
Significantly, no name was given to the Apollo 12 touchdown site on the
Ocean of Storms.
2. The flight of Soviet Spacecraft Luna 15 in relation to Articles III, IX and
XI of the Space Treaty.
On July 13, 1969, three days prior to the scheduled lift-off of Apollo 11,
the Soviet Union launched Luna 15, an unmanned probe, toward lunar
orbit. The Tass Agency said the aim of the flight was "to check the
systems on board the automatic station and to conduct further scientific
exploration of the Moon and space near the Moon." 10 The Soviet Union
did not, at the time it announced the launching, provide the intended orbital
characteristics of its vehicle, from which might be deduced its eventual
proximity to the orbits of the two elements of Apollo 11, Columbia and
Eagle; nor did the Soviet Union seek international or bilateral con-
sultations prior to launch.'
The U.S. reaction to Luna 15 was not entirely consistent. The New
York Times reported that space agency officials were concerned that Luna
15 was a "dramatic attempt to upstage America's scheduled launching of a
lunar mission on Wednesday.' 2 NASA's launch director, Rocco A. Pet-
'°New York Times, July 14, 1969, at 1, col. 8.
111d., col. 7. Russian Space experts had, however, made references to the probe during
the prior week.121d., col. 6.
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rone, made the guess that Russia was attempting something spectacular, a
Moon landing and return of lunar material.' 3
But Col. Neil. A. Armstrong, the next day, responding to a press
conference inquiry about fuel needs based on a possible conflict between
the orbits of the American and Soviet flights, discounted any such conflict,
saying: "I think the probabilities are nearly infinitesimal that would be an
actual case.' 4
Nevertheless, the United States, on July 18, 1969, through Col. Frank
Borman, asked the Soviets for specific information beyond that already
issued. Academician Mstislov V. Keldysh, President of the Soviet Acade-
my of Sciences, communicated to the U.S. the mathematical values of the
orbital elements, concluding that "the orbit of probe of Luna 15 does not
intersect the trajectory of Apollo 11 spacecraft announced by you in flight
program.' 5 Thereupon NASA expressed pleasure with the Russian re-
sponse, and ventured the hope that it indicated fruitful cooperation in the
future. 16
The entire proceedings cannot be said to have reflected the most artistic
way of handling the informational aspects of Luna 15. A lingering residue
of suspicion of Russian motives and fear of potential danger to Apollo 11
persisted on American television commentary despite the Russian an-
nouncement.
Article III of the Space Treaty requires the Parties to conduct outer
space activities "in the interests of maintaining international peace and
security and promoting international cooperation and understanding."
(Emphasis supplied)
Article IX requires States to conduct activities on the Moon and other
celestial bodies "with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other
States Parties to the treaty." It then goes on to say, among other things,
that if a State has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned
by it would cause potential harmful interference with the activities of other
States Parties, it shall undertake appropriate international consultations
before proceeding with any such activity or experiment.
Can it be said that the Soviet Union adhered to the spirit as well as the
letter of Articles III and IX?
The question of "upstaging" may be dismissed out of hand. If the moon
13NEWSDAY, July 14, 1969, at 3. Kenneth Gatland, Vice President of the British
Interplanetary Society, criticized Luna 15 as a "rather unnecessary experiment just before the
Americans make their historic bid to land a man on the moon.
14New York Times, July 15, 1969, at 15, col. 6.
151d., July 19, 1969, at 38, col. 8.161d., at 19, col. 5.
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project was, from the beginning, the question of "beating the Soviets" as
President Kennedy wrote,' 7 the Soviets cannot be faulted for attempting,
unsuccessfully as it turned out, to salvage a precious bit of dwindling
prestige.
But in 1969, the question was also one of fulfilling a Space Treaty
obligation. Under Article IX, Russia is required to act with due regard to
an interest of the U.S. -a paramount interest-of insuring the safety of its
astronauts as they orbited the Moon. This implied that other nations not
only refrain from creating additional dangers but also avoid acts creating a
fear of danger, well- or unfounded.
In addition, even if the Soviet Union, in possession of the statistical
basis of its certainty that Luna 15 would not intersect Apollo 11, felt it had
no reason to call for consultations with the U.S., the Soviet Union under
Article IX had a duty to inform the U.S., well in advance of the event, of
the facts which Academician Keldysh later provided only on request. 18
This is particularly true, since Article XI requires a Treaty Party to furnish
the Secretary General, as well as the public to the greatest extent feasible
and practicable, with the nature, conduct, locations and results of such
activities.
Though the general reporting feature of Article XI refers primarily to
communications to be submitted after the activities have been completed, it
does not preclude the possibility of prior notice in certain cases.19 In the
context of a contemporaneous all-important U.S. lunar expedition, advance
information was certainly desirable, and would have followed the spirit, if
not the letter, of Article X1.20 The initial non-disclosure of critical in-
formation speaks for itself.
It must be said, finally, that NASA's public speculations as to Soviet
motives might well have been dispensed with in favor of an immediate
17Letter to Vice President Johnson, April 30, 1961, reprinted New York Times, July 17,
1969, Special Supplement, at 32, col. 4.18Once a State believes an activity may cause harmful interference, it is mandatory for
that State to "provide information on its intentions; it went without saying that no con-
sultation could take place without prior notification." These were the Soviet Union's own
words in the Legal Subcommittee. U.N. Doc A/AC. 105/C.2/SR.68, at 4-5.
'
9See Comments of Japanese representative and Bulgarian representative in the Legal
Subcomittee, supra, note 18 , at 6-8. Originally, the Soviet draft treaty did not'contain any
provision for reporting; A/AC.105/35 Annex I, at 12-16. Later it insisted on .the principle of
voluntarism. Id., Annex Ill, at 3. Finally, however, it abandoned that reservation. On the
matter of prior notification, a UAR proposal that "all information shall be promptly submitted,
preferably in advance or at the carrying out of these activities or immediately after" was never
accepted. Id., Annex Ill, at 5.21The American view concedes that the phrase "to the greatest extent feasible and
practical" whittles down the reporting obligation to one largely subject to the judgment of
each country. Hearings Before Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate on Treaty of
Outer Space, 90th Cong, 1st Sess, at 60-61, U.S. Gov't Printing Office, Washington, D. C.
International Lawyer, Vol. 4, No. 3
420 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
request for the desired information, in the interest of international under-
standing.
3. The Apollo 11 and 12 precautions against contamination in relation to
Article IX of the Space Treaty.
Article IX of the Space Treaty is directed in great part against harmful
contamination of both celestial bodies and reverse contamination of Earth,
as follows:
States Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space, including the
Moon and other celestial bodies, and conduct exploration of them so as to
avoid their harmful contamination and also adverse changes in the environ-
ment of Earth resulting from the introduction of extra-terrestrial matter, and
where necessary, shall adopt appropriate measures for this purpose.
Contamination is the introduction of impurities to a given place. There is
little difference in meaning between harmful contamination, barred from
celestial bodies by the above article, and adverse changes in environment,
applied to Earth, except in degree. The one is local, the other widespread.
A large degree of contamination, whether on Earth or Moon, would lead to
changes in environment.
Neither contamination nor changes in environment is limited to biologi-
cal effects. The introduction of unwanted non-living matter to either Moon
or Earth might result in harmful contamination or adverse changes in
environment.
In the Apollo 11 flight, prevention of reverse contamination of Earth,
from a biologic standpoint, took center stage, and very little public atten-
tion was directed to contamination of the Moon by Earth materials. If
non-living gases (oxygen and carbon dioxide) and terrestrial bacteria were
introduced to the Moon's surface when Eagle's hatch was opened, it is
doubtful that any bacteria will survive, much less thrive, on the Moon's
radiation-ridden surface. 21
The Committee on Space Research (COSPAR), through its Con-
sultative Group on the Potentially Harmful Effects of Space Experiments,
considered, in 1964, the question of contamination of the Moon and the
planets. The Consultative Group then recommended standards of ster-
ilization for the protection of possible life on Mars and recommended that
the nations declare Mars a biological preserve.22
2 1Actually, on the Apollo 11 flight, a fan near the opening of Eagle's hatch drew the
capsule's air back in, rather than permitted its escape.22UN Doc A/AC.105/20, Annex Ill, at 3. The full Committee on Space Research never
formally ratified the Consultative Group Recommendations.
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COSPAR said that exobiology should be a primary objective of space
science activities, and that the introduction of Earth contaminants would
interfere with detection experiments on the planets and lead to undesirable
alterations of planetary environment. It expressed the belief that the scien-
tific desirability of sterility control was absolute, but the degree of sterility
depended on a judgment of acceptable risks, without the taking of which
planetary exploration would not proceed.
This judgment was that the probability that a single viable organism
would be aboard any vehicle intended for planetary landing must be less
than 1 x 10- 4 (one chance in 10,000), and that the probability of accidental
planetary impact by an unsterilized fly-by or orbiter must be less than 3 x
10-5 (three chances in 100,000).23 These standards applied to Mars and to
other planets which "cannot firmly be excluded as a possible abode of
terrestrial life," 24 including Venus.
However the Moon was thought to stand in a somewhat less critical
situation than Mars:
In the case of the Moon, the surface conditions are rigorous enough to
reliably exclude biological contamination of the surface. We cannot exclude
the possibility that conditions several tens of metres below the lunar surface
will permit microbial replication. Such depths, however, are unlikely to be
reached unintentionally during lunar landings. Accordingly, we recommend
much less rigorous sterilization techniques as bioclean room assembly and
terminal gaseous sterilization of all spacecraft intended for future landings;
but rigorous sterilization of drills desired for lunar subsurface boring. 25
It was then the scientific consensus in 1964 that the surface of the Moon
could be firmly excluded as a harbor for terrestrial life, but that this could
not be said for depths of, say, 30 feet. In this view, no part of the Apollo 11
or 12 missions disregarded the 1964 standards, assuming the drills used for
lunar cores were sterilized.
In 1966, COSPAR met again. This time, it refrained from specifying
fixed values for the probability of contamination, in the belief that weighing
the facts was "best left to those nations responsible for meeting (for each of
its own missions) the overall constraint on the probability of planetary
contamination, and that by doing so engineering implementation is freed of
an unnecessary constraint." 26
Thus, each nation is judge of its own decisions and is liberated from
231d., at 13-15.
241d., at 15 (emphasis in original).
251d., at 16.26Hall, Recent Developments in Planetary Quarantine, 9 DEVELOPMENTS IN IN-
DUSTRIAL MICROBIOLOGY, 19, 21. Amer. Institute of Biological Sciences, Washington, D. C.
1968.
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specific international restraints. In view of this history, it would be difficult
to argue that Article IX of the Space Treaty incorporates the 1964 COS-
PAR Standards, or any definitive standards at all, although it might be said
that those standards have not been withdrawn and are still factual touch-
stones to be observed.
It will be noted, however, that COSPAR did not publicly discuss the
merits or demerits of exposing the Moon to non living terrestrial elements.
Arthur C. Clarke reports estimates that the combustion products and cabin
leakage from only 20 landings of the Apollo type could double the mass of
the very tenuous lunar atmosphere, and the rate of contamination will
increase when mining, food production and similar activities begin.2 7
Article IX does not outlaw all contamination-just "harmful" con-
tamination; harmful, that is, to the uses to which the Moon is to be put or
such that it would interfere with the activities of States Parties to the
treaty. Under the treaty, then, it would be permissible to import and
distribute substances not indigenous to the Moon, provided that these
substances do not pose a disadvantage for others who come later.
The difficulty is that the full range of optimum uses to which the Moon is
to be put remains as yet unknown. One prime lunar use is that of an
astronomical laboratory. The Moon provides a clear unclouded window to
the rest of the universe. The Moon may also be called a cosmic archae-
ologist's dream, being a store-house of information about the origin of the
Earth and of the solar system. It is even suggested that the far side of the
Moon, free from Earth's radio noises, may be a listening post for the
messages of extraterrestrial beings.2 8
Competing governmental or commercial uses may interfere with these
scientific uses. If water is found in extractable form on the Moon, this may
encourage the setting up of self supported lunar bases used to produce
rocket fuel for regular Earth-Moon missions, and as a launching stage for
deep space voyages. If scarce resources such as titanium are exploitable,
mining camps may mushroom on the Moon. Several publicity-conscious
airlines have already compiled reservation lists for Earth-Moon passenger
trips; these tourist jaunts presuppose the establishment of a Luna-Hilton
chain on the Sea of Tranquility. Thomas 0. Paine, NASA's administrator,
foresees lunar colonization in the form of domed cities, and other planetary
societies with "diverging cultural trajectories. ' '2 9
2 7NY Times, July 17, 1969, Special Supplement, at 47, col. 1. But Dr. A.G.W. Cameron
points out that doubling the present insignificant lunar atmosphere would be insignificant in
itself, and that such atmosphere would soon be dissipated in space due to the moon's weak
gravity. Transcript of WEVD Radio Panel, Colonies on the Moon, Nov. 7, 1969, New York.28 1d., August 3, 1969, Special Supplement, at 17.29Supra, note 27.
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Well, why not? What better use for the dead Moon than creation of a
mirror Earth? Still, all these latter uses involve electrical, nuclear and
rocket installations, the by-product of which will create a film around the
Moon and alter its surface to the despair of cosmologists and Rosetta-stone
practitioners. To cite an example of unexpected interference: a dump of
waste water from Apollo 11, Moon-ward bound, is reported to have
masked stars for nearly an hour.30
At the very least, activities on the Moon as on Earth, should proceed,
not haphazardly, but according to a considered judgment of all con-
sequences, with an eye to the future. If the best use of the Moon is a
combined habitation-quarry, this choice should be a conscious choice.
Long-range planning should dictate what contaminants are to be sanc-
tioned, and what degree of contamination permitted. This process involves
more than the optional consultations provided for by Space Treaty Article
IX. It involves continuing international conferences and agreement as to
the particulars and pace of human activities, and the accomodation of
competing uses.
It is believed that this can best be done by an international agency
having jurisdiction over all activities on celestial bodies. If this solution is
not selected, the entire subject should be reviewed by COSPAR, and its
recommendations forwarded to the U.N. Secretary General. The matter is
of sufficient importance to call for a new Subcommittee on the Uses of
Celestial Bodies to be attached to the parent Committee on Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space.3 1
The matter of changes in Earth's own environment has, apparently,
received exhaustive scrutiny, as shown by the immediate three-week quar-
antine of all Apollo 11 and 12 astronauts following their splash-down in
the Pacific Ocean. Prior to launching, a controversy swirled in the Ameri-
can press as to whether the announced precautions were in fact sufficient.
The two supposed deficiencies concerned the venting of the Apollo 11
command module in the upper atmosphere at some point in its descent
toward Earth, and the opening of the hatch of Columbia after splash-down
to permit the exit of the astronauts. There is no way to judge the merits of
the dispute. Logic indicates that if the danger of Earth contamination,
however small, was sufficiently real to call for the extreme of a rigid
3 0 SKY AND TELESCOPE, September, 1969, at 145.
31 ln 1968, the Special Working Group on the Legal Status of Stations on Celestial
Bodies, considering conservation of resources and contamination of celestial bodies, said:
"This is an important problem throughout the whole of space exploration for the future,
affecting Earth as well as the celestial bodies, and may involve scientific consultation on the
lines suggested in Article 9 of the Treaty and action by international bodies such as COS-
PAR." PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH COLLOQUIUM, New York, 1968, at 144.
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quarantine, then all avenues of contact between the transported lunar
material and Earth should have been closed without exception. This is
another question which calls for COSPAR discussion.
4. The dissemination of information on the results of Apollo 11 and 12 in
relation to Article XI of the Space Treaty.
Article XI, as indicated earlier, binds the treaty parties to inform the
Secretary General of the United Nations as well as the public and the
international scientific community, of the nature, conduct, location and
results of space activities. In general the information supplied to the Secre-
tary General has been supplied on a pro-forma basis. The United States
submits an annual report on its national and international space activities to
the Secretary General, special reports on the scientific results of programs
of unusual interest, and a broad selection of the scientific and technical
publications which report the detail of the NASA program.
By far, the greater amount of information on the Moon landing has
reached the public through press briefings, interviews, television programs
and popular articles authored by prominent persons such as Wehrner Von
Braun, Robert Jastrow, Thomas 0. Paine and Isaac Asimov. In the case of
the Soviet government, space news reaches the world through government
agency releases, radio programs and international conference papers. The
Soviet Union obviously construes Article XI obligations narrowly, as
shown by the paucity of information supplied, usually after the fact, rarely
in advance. The world at large is still ignorant of the true nature and actual
results of Luna 15. Both nations, however, appear to have fulfilled their
basic obligations to the international scientific community, through COS-
PAR, scholarly publications and general information exchanges.
The dramatic nature of space exploits has emphasized public dis-
semination of information rather than the role of the Secretary General.
This is a healthy development, permitting people of all nations to be direct
witnesses to the lunar landing. The Secretary General's function has been
saved for dissemination of specialized information relating to in-
tergovernmental space activities.3 2
This discussion has thus far revolved around the application of the
Space Treaty to the Apollo I 1 lunar landing. As planetary exploration
3 2As, for example, its Review of National and Cooperative International Space Activi-
ties. U.N. Doc A/AC. 105L.46.
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proceeds, one may expect human activities to come into contact with other
facets of the Space Treaty. The following would seem to be the most likely
points of legal convergence:
1. Article II in relation to setting up human bases and colonization of the
Moon and Mars.
Present U.S. plans, as revised, call for seven more lunar landings on
sites selected for their topographical differences. Dr. George E. Mueller,
Associate Administrator of NASA, optimistically hopes that water locked
in moon rocks will make possible self-sustaining life-support systems deriv-
ing power from nuclear plants. Then it would be possible to create an
atmosphere for a Moon base, and obtain propellants for travel. Suitable
housing would provide a base, whether nationally or internationally sup-
ported, eventually to exploit the "rich natural resources" which Dr. Muel-
ler believes the Moon to have. The Moon would also become an island
base or way station near Earth, for exploration of more distant parts of the
solar system. It would be possible to build a low-cost re-usable shuttle
system between Earth, Moon and the other planets.3 3
Recently however, NASA's Director, Thomas 0. Paine, told the Com-
mittee for the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space that there is so far no
evidence of the presence of water on the Moon. 34
NASA has issued contracts for a land-rover to expedite lunar explor-
ation, while Donald A. Beattie, program manager for plans and objectives
of NASA's Lunar Exploration Office, envisages men remaining on the
Moon or several weeks by 1973, and for months by 1975-all this followed
by a functioning colony by 1980. He concedes that true coloniza-
tion-people "living, working and raising families" -would depend on the
practical uses to which the lunar surface could be put.3 5
If these predictions come true, the point at which peripheral uses pass
over into national appropriation will have to be considered. National ap-
propriation is wholly forbidden by Article II of the Space Treaty.
An installation or base, manned by a small number of astronauts or
scientists for scientific pruposes, using lunar materials for local needs,
would not constitute national appropriation. A large permanent lunar colo-
ny, private or public, operating under national auspices for commercial
purposes, would, by its magnitude and the nature of its activities, violate
the stricture against national appropriation.
33New York Times, July 21, 1969, at 14.
34New York Post, September 9, 1969, at 25.
:5NEWSDAY: Special Supplement, The Moon, July 25, 1969, at 9A.
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Obviously, borderline situations would be presented if, for example, a
small number of people under one flag occupied a moderate area and
employed lunar materials for both local needs and commercial purposes.
The ban on national appropriation may be the one space treaty provision
flouted in fact, while the parties proclaim their adherence to it or interpret
it out of existence. It is time that Wilfred Jenks' suggestion of a Space
Resources Agreement requiring U.N. concessions for exploitation, be ex-
plored; or, better still, that an international agency for planetary activities
be established.
2. Article IV military provisions in relation to possible surveillance devices
on the Moon.
Military power is more effective at close range than from afar. For that
reason, space military developments have centered on multiple and frac-
tional orbital bombardment systems, military satellite communications,
navigation, surveillance and detection devices, and space stations, all of
them designed for near space rather than celestial bodies.
Article IV prohibits the stationing of nuclear or other weapons of mass
destruction on the planets, and reserves the use of the Moon and other
celestial bodies exclusively for peaceful purposes. 36 The establishment of
military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of weapons and
conduct of military maneuvers on the Moon, are forbidden. Military per-
sonnel may be used on the Moon, but only for scientific research or other
peaceful purposes. In the same way, the use of any equipment or facility
"necessary for peaceful exploration of the Moon and other celestial bod-
ies" is also not prohibited.
It is not appropriate here to review the settled difference in meaning
placed on the word "peaceful" by spokesmen of East and West. Whether
"peaceful" in space matters means only "non-aggressive," and therefore
condones "defensive" military activities, or is expanded to mean
"non-military," has been the subject of recent extended debate. 37 No
further general gloss is possible.
36
"States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any
objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install
such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.
"The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty
exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and
fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers on
celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific research or for
any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility
necessary for peaceful exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be
prohibited."
37 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH COLLOQUIUM OF THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, Supra,
note I, at 24-39, 73-8 1.
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The Space Treaty, however, is special legislation, and must be specially
approached. Article IV treats celestial bodies somewhat differently from
space generally. As to the planets, it forbids military installations. There-
fore, surveillance (and communications) installations serving military aims
predominantly, may not be placed on the Moon.
An object can have an intended purpose and an actual use. The Space
Treaty outlaws surveillance installations in both cases. If these installations
have a predominant rather than incidental scientific or exploratory use, and
the data derived therefrom is actually used for scientific purposes, the
installation is not military. Even if some of the data could be used for
surveillance purposes having a military value in such case, there could be
no legal objection. Thus, in the case of a radar chain deployed on Mare
Tranquillatus to detect and guide incoming ships, the fact that it can also
be used for detecting space military vehicles of another nation or even
Earth-based nuclear plants, could give no rise to justified complaint.
If, however, the main purpose or main use of the installation is for
military surveillance, the treaty would be violated. If it is objected that in
certain cases it may be hard to determine the predominant purpose or use
of an installation, the short answer is that this situation is unlikely -such
circumstance might reflect on the competence of the experts consulted to
determine the facts, rather than the ambiguity of the facts themselves.
Besides, the installation is subject to close inspection by any treaty party.
This problem would not arise if all installations on celestial bodies were
managed by an international agency.
The Space Treaty also permits any "equipment" or "facility" -whether
of military character or not-to be used on celestial bodies, provided it is
necessary for peaceful exploration. Here the authorized use is quite limited
and exclusive. The word "necessary" adds weight to this restriction. Any
use other than for an exploratory (including scientific) purpose is banned.
This effectively prohibits any use of equipment for military surveillance
irrespective of the interpretation of the phrase "peaceful uses," and irres-
pective of whether the surveillance purpose or use was predominant or
incidental.38
To sum up, the best interpretation of this portion of Article IV is that an
incidental use of an installation on the Moon for military surveillance is
permitted, provided that the main purpose and use of the installation is not
38The distinction between an installation and equipment or facility is that an installation
probably contains a greater number of component units and has a greater degree of per-
manence and/or attachment to the lunar surface. But not too much stress should be placed on
the semantic distinction, because Article IV log-rolled specific U.S. and Soviet draft
phraseology into one article. The word "installation" was included at the insistance of the
United States; the word "equipment" at Russian insistence. See U.N. Doc A/AC. 105C.2/SR
65, at 9-11.
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military. But no piece of equipment may be used for military surveillance at
any time. Though this distinction is illogical, it flows from the provisions of
the treaty and from the background of the negotiations.
It is believed that space surveillance in general has in fact provided
subjective security and therefore peace, irrespective of the motives of any
State, because it enables each potential adversary more correctly to gauge
the weapons of the other side, and warns those in power of the danger of
military adventures. But since, in the case of space, satellites in near-space
are as effective for surveillance as are installations or equipment on celes-
tial bodies, it is recommended that all nations refrain from using any
celestial body for any form of military surveillance if only to avoid mutual
irritation.
3. Article II and VI provisions in reference to non-governmental private
tourist activities on the Moon.
Pan American Airlines currently has on hand 70,000 reservations for
lunar trips estimated to cost $14,000 round trip per person. The airline has
received no charter from the Civil Aeronautics Board to run flights to the
Moon.
The Space Treaty aside, no legislation directly prohibits a private citizen
or U.S. firm from lofting a spaceship to the Moon, or establishing crater
cabins on terminator taverns. Though the National Aeronautics and Space
Act of 1958 contains a Congressional declaration that all non-military
space activities "shall be the responsibility of, and shall be directed by a
civilian agency exercising control over aeronautical and space activities
sponsored by the United States . . ," this declaration, in its context, was
only inter-governmental legislation concentrating the powers and functions
of different space-oriented administrative bodies into NASA, and did not
affect private rights.
However, indirect legal barriers to unauthorized private launches would
be insuperable. The Federal Airport Act gives the Federal Aviation
Agency power to formulate policy as to the use of navigable airspace and
to prescribe regulations governing the flight of aircraft; the agency has in
fact issued rules for unmanned rockets. This mandate might very well be
interpreted to apply to all spacecraft while in airspace. The Federal Com-
munications Commission regulates the use of telemetry frequencies which
are the life force of space vehicles. Other United States statutes and the
laws of many states regulate and license the use of explosive materials.a 9
39See National Aeronautics and Space Act, 72 Stat. 426 (1958), 42 USCA 2451 (1964);
powers of the Federal Aviation Agency are reflected in 49 USCA 1348, and see FAA Regs.,
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No doubt every State intended, from the first, to preserve a monopoly
over all space launchings. It was, in fact, the Soviet view that all space
activities should "be carried out solely and exclusively by States" as well
as controlled by them. 40 This view was resisted by Western nations which
desired some space activities like telecommunications, to be operated by
private enterprise.
The Space Treaty places on States international responsibility for all
national activities in space or on celestial bodies, whether the activities are
carried on by government or by non-governmental entities, and says, in
Article VI,
The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the
Moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing
supervision by the appropriate State Party to the treaty.
This means that all aspects of space flight to the planets and all activities
on the planets must be regulated by the State concerned from start to
finish. This is because, as Jenks has said, space activities are too enmeshed
in matters affecting international peace and security to be a proper field for
private enterprise. 41
Aside from the above considerations, no legal reason prevents a private
company, nationally supervised, from ferrying sightseers to the Moon,
though they are likely, on the ground of expense, to prefer that the govern-
ment concerned actually launch the vehicle.
It would be possible for private tourist flights to take place if no exten-
sive permanent facilities on the Moon were involved, but a real conflict
would arise with non-appropriation Article II in the case of extensive
permanent facilities. The building of a chain of hotels and supporting
facilities on the Moon would occupy an inordinate amount of terrain and
might well constitute an appropriation. It might also contravene Article I of
the Space Treaty which requires space uses to be carried out for the benefit
of all countries. In the example given, the benefit would enure to private
individuals of one nation or a small set of nations. Private prospecting for
minerals, too, would undoubtedly constitute illegal appropriation.
4. Article XII inspection privileges in relation to future lunar exploration.
If indeed installations, bases and colonies come to be placed on the
14 CFR, Part 101; 47 USCA § 301 deals with telecommunications. As to expolosives see 50
USCA 121-131 and 134. Future use of nuclear fuel would fall under the watchful eye of the
Atomic Energy Commission 42 USCA 2077 and 2131.
4 0U.N. Doc A/AC.105/6, at 4, July 9, 1962.
4 1 JENKS, SPACE LAW, 1965, at 211.
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Moon or on Mars, Article XII of the Space Treaty, providing for access on
reasonable advance notice, will become increasingly important.
Such inspections would be desirable for several reasons, such as to
assure:
1. that Article II national appropriation does not take place.
2. that prohibited military uses do not take place.
3. that private activities have some governmental authorization
and are properly supervised.
4. that no harmful contamination or potential interference with
activities of other States takes place.
Most of these assurances may be satisfied by aerial inspection or by the
monitoring of communications, but some aspects may require on-site in-
spection. The results of all visits should be reported to the Secretary
General, the public and the scientific community as prescribed by Article
XI.
Complaints of alleged violations would call for consultations. Unfortu-
nately, no arbitral or judicial body has been set up by the Space Treaty to
settle disputes arising from such violations. Under present international
law, the disputants have recourse, on mutual consent, to negotiations,
inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and to the International Court
of Justice. The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, although
not yet in force, and which in any case would not apply retroactively to the
Space Treaty, nevertheless points the way to possible conciliation proce-
dures. Under the Vienna Convention, a majority of a panel of five con-
ciliators is empowered to make non-binding recommendations in a special
class of disputes. 42
Compulsory settlement of disputes would, however, be preferable in a
matter of such cosmic urgency. It may be advisable, too, to give private
persons the right to move to enjoin flagrant treaty violations, since every
person has a stake in the peaceful use of outer space.
The International Exploration of Celestial Bodies.
It is apparent that whatever. problems arise in the settlement of celestial
bodies will spring from conflicts of national interests, and may aggravate
tensions on Earth. This is particularly true in respect to quasi-military
activities and exploitation of resources on a national basis. It is for this
reason that an international agency having jurisdiction over all activities on
42The text of the Vienna Convention may be found in VIII International Legal Mate-
rials, No. 4 (July, 1969) at 679-713, see 712-713 for the annex dealing with conciliation; also
63 AMER JL. INT. LAW, at 875-903, October, 1969.
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celestial bodies has been promoted by many space commentators. The
suggestion of Jenks for a Space Resources Agreement4 3 and of Richard N.
Gardner for a United Nations Space Institute44 have the same rational
basis: prevention of conflict and promotion of international concord.
On September 20, 1963, President Kennedy urged that the United
States and the Soviet Union send a joint expedition to the Moon. 45 The
fate of the Kennedy gesture is an interesting example of international
delinquency. The public record is insufficient for a test of the sincerity of
national spokesmen in reference to joint U.S.-Russian space flights. The
utterances of the protagonists abound in structural ambiguities. President
Kennedy seems to have proposed a joint Moon flight without hard spe-
cifics. The proposal was given only lukewarm support by NASA, and met
immediate Congressional hostility. It is not even certain that any formal
proposals were made, although preliminary steps to implement the Presi-
dent's proposal were suggested informally from time to time.
Russia treated the Kennedy proposal coolly, ignored it, tied it to the
solution of other international problems, and neither accepted the Kennedy
plan nor offered substantive proposals of her own. The foot-dragging was
more pronounced on the Soviet side. In the end, both countries abandoned
talk of joint efforts, and were reduced to quiet and innocuous murmurs of
international cooperation and collaboration.
It is periodically necessary to reiterate the reasons why an international
space agency is desirable. This paper has referred to several practical
benefits of a space agency with respect to control of contamination, man-
agement or lunar bases and surveillance. A more basic treatment is now
warranted.
There are two approaches to the question of the merits of an in-
ternational planetary organization. One may, if one chooses, deal with the
subject of activities on celestial bodies as an isolated subject, separate from
the rest of international law and life. Under this perfectly permissible
approach, it is necessary to justify an international organization in terms of
specific advantages to particular aspects of space progress. The question
then arises as to whether more or less centralization will be beneficial for
on-going space activity. 46
"Supra, note 37, at 246-265.
"New York Times, July 26, 1969, at 24, col. 5.
"New York Times, September 21, 1963, at 1, col. 8.
"6The Introductory Report by Eilene Galloway in the PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH
COLLOQUIUM, at 8-13 is a cogent example of this approach. It attempts to determine whether
a space agency would be more helpful than not in implementing the Space Treaty; whether it
could better guarantee freedom of access and scientific investigation of celestial bodies, better
redress a violation of the non-appropriation clause Article 11, better enforce the non-military
aspects of Article IV, better handle registration of space vehicles, and so forth.
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Given this diminished field of view, one might even find that the space
race spurs the total world space effort, accelerates space-related invention,
and provides a diversity of detail and a testing ground for technological
innovation. 47
Whether the total speed-up of space exploration, coupled with corre-
sponding short-range benefits to particular space powers, is sufficient to
justify the huge cost of two parallel systems, the duplication of effort, and
the forfeiture of possible results obtainable by a unified world-space-devel-
opment program is an interesting question in cost analysis worthy of
further study.
The alternate approach places international space activities in the con-
text of the human world-the world of the arms race and the threat of
nuclear war in which the combined annual defense budgets of the two
superpowers alone is well over $100 billion; in which bloody conflicts flare
up and continue on all continents, threatening to draw the great powers
into a final holocaust; in which nations compete with one another for
markets and resources with unabated fury; in which the new hydra-headed
specter of overpopulation, civil wars, famine, disease, riots and ecological
disaster rear up in front of a horizon of future possibilities of long life,
health, leisure, miracle grains, travel for all, instant communications and
planetary conquest.
Under this approach, the activities of all men and nations are in-
extricably intertwined and cannot be detached from each other as if they
were artifacts suspended in a conceptual vacuum. History cannot be
ignored. World Wars I and II were not mirages. Pernicious and unremit-
ting, national rivalries in all their forms and features pervade the waking
hours of all national leaders and poison all human endeavor.
To the distress of anti-rationalists, there is a remedy. The remedy is for
nations to join in common endeavors that will produce a unity of interest in
peace. No surrender of national sovereignties is involved. A network of
functional, integrated activities should be encouraged that would gradually
displace the excessive competitive aspects of the power struggle which,
organized on national lines, has always led to organized violence. Space
flight has seized the imagination of men. It can serve also as a catalyst for
the institutions of peace.
47 Rivalry with the Soviet Union, thus, became one of the main factors in energizing
America's space effort. Staff Report: SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS 1962-1965, Committee on
Astronautical and Space Sciences, at 3.
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